Tuesday, June 23, 2020

The Future State of SIEMs - Part 3 ("The How")

If you read Part 1, https://medium.com/@Anvilogic/the-future-state-of-siems-part-1-the-what-149056482fef, and Part 2, https://medium.com/@Anvilogic/the-future-state-of-siems-part-2-the-why-efffc64ffb6f?sk=81c7396126ab6cd0b5822408f05d51b9, of this topic series, then you are ready to learn how the revolution should happen in the SIEM and surrounding SOC stack such that relevant, high-efficacy, ready-to-deploy content will stream into the SIEM and result in highly actionable alerts leading to high rates of automation in downstream systems. This is not an evolutionary “how” rather it introduces a new paradigm that not only makes highly accurate detection content available to SOCs thereby increasing the rate of orchestration and automation but also future-proofs SOCs against the changing threat landscape as well as security architecture in that they will no longer be centrally dependent on a single SIEM.

There are several key elements in this new architecture of a Content Platform, including a content repository and frameworks but the most important is the capability to empower security experts to build necessary content (=detection logic) without needing to be tool experts or code developers. Such a flexible, code-less, UI wizard-driven content builder utilizes content objects that have gone through the frameworks and are ready to be linked together to form high efficacy scenario detections that result in fewer but more accurate, actionable alerts for SOC teams to triage.

The above architecture will be underpinned by a secure collaboration channel, which allows SOC teams to collaborate with one another, both internally within the SOC as well as externally with peers in other enterprises, optionally. Collaboration is possible at the code level, wherein actual code can be exchanged, or at the comments and best-practice levels which are more free-form text exchanges. Code-level exchanges are only possible because of the embedded standardization frameworks in this architecture.

This concise description of the next-gen SOC content platform architecture is imperative, and will split the monolithic SIEM stack such that Content will no longer be a part of the SIEM, rather it will be supplied by the framework-led, collaborative content platform which will serve all enterprise rules engines, such as a central SIEM, several micro data lakes, end-points etc., resulting in the future discussed here - https://medium.com/@Anvilogic/being-a-soc-content-platform-4ccd27c2472a. 

For more on how this will work in your SOC, sign up for our free trial at www.anvilogic.com. 

Monday, June 1, 2020

The Future State of SIEMs - Part 2 ("The Why")

If you read Part 1 of this topic series, https://medium.com/@Anvilogic/the-future-state-of-siems-part-1-the-what-149056482fef, then you are likely wondering why there needs to be a future state of SIEMs other than the usual reason that anything must evolve/improve over time. However, it’s more dire and revolutionary than that.

SIEMs have long been the ‘go-to’ system for data collection, alerting and triage from a technology standpoint but have always been reliant on the knowledge, priorities and intellect of the individuals running the SOC for core content – detection and triage logic – that sets everything in motion. This – content – is the core value of the central part of a SOC that needs domain expertise, not just technology. Unfortunately, a bulk of resources is spent in on-boarding data, conforming to ‘data models’ (though that’s an overloaded complimentary term) and coding basic rules that generate noisy alerts. These tasks are supposed to be table stakes – a means to an end, and not the end itself. But too often SIEM implementations start and end with these necessary but not sufficient tasks. And end up burning out analysts and making downstream triage/response automation impossible.

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It’s time to elevate the game to better detection, and hence, better response methods. This is not necessarily a ding on SIEM vendors; they do what they do best – ingest data, help analyze/investigate, help automate but the core detection content needs to come from subject matter and domain experts who’ve ‘been there and done that’ and not from technology vendors who are good at engineering but not necessarily good at the dynamic security landscape. Therefore, the state of a SIEM needs to change in order to strengthen the core – detection content – and therefore deliver significant productivity gains to the SOC where budgets for systems or people are not necessarily increasing commensurate to the needs.

There are three phenomena that are happening in order to compensate for the content weakness of SIEMs:

1.     The lack of better detection leading to precise incidents that are truly actionable is why EDRs are implementing their own silo’ed detection/response logic at the end points, and other similar technologies are doing the same, mainly for lack of efficient and precise logic in the SIEM and sometimes for licensing cost reasons. The world is getting decentralized for convenience but at the cost of not correlating across enterprise data to get the richest of signals leading to the most precise incident alerts.

2.     The problem doesn’t end there – it continues downstream to the orchestration and automation side of the SOC too. This is the reason SOAR systems’ playbooks are mostly enrichment (more contextual data) in order to better understand the alert and dismiss it as a false positive or accept it as an action-worthy incident. As a result, SOAR systems are making up for the lack of efficacy of the SIEM system, and that’s not a wise use of resources, and leads to inadequate automation. In a nutshell, other systems are making up for the lack of SIEM functionality – core detection logic that will drive better rates of predictable, repeatable and successful automation.

3.     Finally, if there is no core system of record that assesses maturity factually, then it’s impossible to truly know the state of security preparedness of an enterprise. How can a CISO effectively answer the question, “what does our security coverage look like?” In order to be able to answer that correctly, there needs to be a system that dispenses detection content across enterprise priorities and frameworks such as the MITRE ATT&CK framework, and is able to generate metrics on efficacy, coverage, gaps, peer comparisons, maturity scores etc. SIEMs cannot perform all these functions – they just need to perform their core function well – that is, implement relevant, implementable, high efficacy detection logic which will come from elsewhere (discussed in the next part of this blog post series), and truly achieve a high rate of automation in the SOC.

Humans should not be chasing data and noisy alerts and triaging the basics, nor should other systems be compensating. And, neither should SOC executives be struggling to assess their level of maturity and security coverage. A SOC’s domain experts should not be making up for the lack of expert content in the SIEM rather they must be spending their time elevating and customizing it for their environments, easily, without needing to be programming experts nor threat landscape experts. There needs to be a dominant change in the SOC to bring in strong, relevant and high efficacy content to the SIEM – this meets the unsaid, implied need for productivity gains the SOC so desperately needs today. This is also described in a previous blog posting, https://medium.com/@Anvilogic/being-a-soc-content-platform-4ccd27c2472a. 


These are the true answers to the “Why do SIEMs need a future state” question. In a nutshell, SIEMs need way better content driving detection (alerts), and that must not continue to come in a manual, ad-hoc, difficult manner from SOC teams – a Content Platform needs to drive this change. And this is the basis for the next part of this series that will discuss the “How” …

Friday, May 29, 2020

Content Conundrums for the SOC: Part II

If you survived the first SOC conundrum for content development, then your organization is well on its way towards building new and exciting content without having to worry about those senseless questions when new threats emerge such as whether the threat is even relevant to your organization. Instead, your organization should be quick to determine threat applicability and move forward with a well-defined and streamlined content development process using build, attack, and defend methodologies. If you aren’t at this point, you can refer back to my previous post, and part 1 of this series, here.

With this stream of new and applicable content being developed into your SIEM for consumption by your Incident Response team, you now have several new detection queries actively looking for threats within your environment but how in the world are you going to manage this growing content repository when each piece of code was developed individually with no sense of reusability and how exactly are you planning to ensure that the past pieces of content developed are even still applicable now that time has passed? And in here lies the next content conundrums for the SOC.

Let’s start with a few issues that need to be addressed:
1.     How is your organization going to handle a situation where a critical component of these detection queries change?
2.     How is your organization going to ensure that logic blocks within your queries are repeatable and can continue to be refined over time?
3.     How is your organization going to validate that content previously produced remains applicable and working correctly over time?

The idea that your organization just produced a large quantity of content which took a painstaking amount of time and resources all to be rendered fully useless by a change in a data storage schema or even just partially useless to newly onboarded business units because their data needs to be incorporated into the logic is a nightmare. No one wants to have to go through each individual piece of content and update components one by one especially when there is a lot of room for human error. So how would you go about making sure that manually going through all your past developed content is not a reality? Easy, modularize your content to its fullest extent. This can be done via functions or macros or whatever reusable logic grouping  your organizations SIEM may utilize. The idea here is to modularize every piece of logic that can be reused for another piece of content, even how you call a certain data set should be modularized just to account for data storage schema changes and new data storage objects being created for new business units. Luckily, this idea resolves the second issue addressed above as well by having complex logic blocks modularized into these functions or macros, you can ensure that any statistical aggregation, machine learning algorithm, or anything else can continuously be improved and have all of your old content be automatically improved with each update. Sounds great not having to go back and update everything one by one every time you update a way you perform a particular statistical analysis or even something as simple as a data call, right? It is, and it is going to save your analysts an incredible amount of time while granting them reassurance that everything is running with the latest and greatest. With that, we have also introduced the third issue stated above which is how exactly do you know that those great new updates to those code blocks didn’t break anything..

In a worst case scenario, those modularized logic block updates would require you to go back and do the same thing you have been trying to remove from your workload just to have peace of mind that everything is still functioning. You just saved all of this time by making your updates ensure that everything is running on your most up-to-date logic developments just to add that time right back due to lack of validation and regression testing. Here, the best method is to automate the regression testing of your rules when updates are made. This can be done via custom scripts or even via playbooks within a SOAR system as long as that SIEM you are testing against supports some sort of API call to run remote searches. Of course there are a couple things you are going to have to incorporate into your B.A.D. processes referenced in Part I of this series which is essentially having your Red/Attack Team take note of exploit time simulations that way that, in conjunction with your detection queries, those variables can be passed via remote searches for very particular time frames where you can ensure that results will appear. If your automation comes back with certain detection queries returning null results after a modularized logic block update, then you know something went wrong. At the same time, you can utilize this same automation to check whether certain detection queries are no longer applicable by performing a periodic review of the outputs and metadata associated with every search ran in your automated regression tests. This will help to ensure that you are keeping system utilization as low as possible to make way for the detection content that is still applicable to your environment.

We hope that these insights are helping your organization tackle your SOC content conundrums head on. If there are any other difficult problems your organization is faced with today, feel free to reach out as we would love to hear you out. In the meantime, stay tuned for Content Conundrums for the SOC: Part III.

At Anvilogic, we take SOC content development seriously going through several vigorous cycles to ensure that all content developed is as robust, efficient, and applicable as possible and we hope to help your SOC’s detection content achieve the next level. Let us know how we can help you or visit us at www.anvilogic.com.

Friday, May 22, 2020

Becoming a Mature SOC: Part 1 – Why aren’t we flattening the curve?

If there is one thing everybody can agree on, it’s that cybersecurity breaches have risen significantly over the last 15 years, and so has the monetary and reputational impacts that follow as a result.  One interesting trend that we have noticed over this time period is that there are 5 major factors that continue to increase at rapid paces:
  1. Number of security breaches being reported are on the rise each year, including dwell time to respond
  2. Enterprise financial and reputational impacts of breaches continue to rise
  3. Cybersecurity technology market has grown 35X in the last 15 years
  4. Enterprise spending in the security market continues to rise, currently exceeding $115 billion
  5. The volume of data created within organizations has increased by 700% over the last 10 years
What is interesting to note here is that it doesn’t appear that the security market has been able to properly “flatten the curve” on improving the enterprises’ ability to adequately prevent, detect and respond to cyber threats.  Now, there can be many reasons behind why this is, but it is important to note that regardless of the reasons why, we know companies are spending billions of dollars on security and we are still seeing record increases in breaches being reported.

Are enterprises receiving a return on their security investments, or are they experiencing a false sense of security?  Why haven’t we flattened the curve?




Before we get into the reasons why, let’s just look at some of the industry numbers that justify the basis for these thoughts.


Breaches Reported:
  • According to Verizon’s 2020 Breach report, they investigated 3,950 confirmed breaches across multiple industries, up 87% from their 2019 report of 2,103.
  • According to Tech Republic, data breaches increased by 54% in 2019.
  • According to IBM, breaches caused by malicious or criminal attacks are a growing threat and has increased by 21% over the past six years.

Enterprise Impacts:
  • According to IBM research, the cost of a data breach has risen 12% over the last 5 years, averaging close to $4 million dollars per breach
  • According to IBM, the amount of time it took for organizations to detect a security breach (dwell time) was 279 days in 2019, up 5% from 266 days in 2018.

Enterprise Spending:
  • According to Gartner, worldwide spending on information security products and services exceeded $114 billion in 2018, increasing 12% from the previous year.  They forecast the market to grow to $170 billion by 2022.  

Cybersecurity Market:
  • According to Wired.com, the cybersecurity market has grown 35X over the last 13 years, and they anticipate a 12-15 percent year-over-year cybersecurity market growth through 2021.    

Data Volumes:
  • According to Statista.com, the volume of data/information created worldwide from 2010 to 2020 has increased by 700%.

Let’s Flatten the Curve

Based on all this information, let’s make this basic assumption – organizations are spending billions on cybersecurity technology and prevention, but still struggle to properly assess, quantify and measure their overall cybersecurity maturity/risk posture.  As a result, even after all this money is spent, they still have difficulty quantifying the value this all provides to the business and whether or not they are better off today than they were yesterday.   

As you begin to think about how to improve your security maturity posture, we encourage you to take a step back and think about ways you can improve using the technology, data, and resources you already have.  Instead of chasing the next shiny security tool, focus on the improvements you can make using your existing technology, because sometimes, the extra visibility you need or want you may already have. 

The successful model for running an effective security organization is your ability to properly prevent, detect, analyze, and contain/mitigate cyber threats.

To be able to do this effectively, you need to do 2 things very well, intelligence and data.  Intelligence should be driven by threat research and an understanding of the core business processes that can be impacted by those threats.  Your data hygiene coming from technology - the security event logs and application feeds, need to be structured, enriched, concise, and readily available to your security teams so they can use it to build detections and effectively respond to incidents. 

Over the next couple of weeks, we will be posting on how Anvilogic can help you flatten your curve using the technology, data, and resources you already have. 

Think about your maturity…


Intelligence
  • Have you prioritized the threats you need to prevent?
  • Do you have an understanding of the core infrastructure you need to protect?
  • Do you understand the critical business processes that use this core infrastructure?  Do you know how the business actually works/operates?
Data
  • Do you have the data sources needed to detect those threats and protect that core infrastructure and business process? 
  • Is that data structured, enriched, normalized and usable? 
Content
  • Do you have the detection content necessary to adequately respond to those threats in that core infrastructure and business process? 
  • Does that content have a combination of threat intelligence and business intelligence?
  • Do you actually correlate activity across different data domains
  • What is your detection efficacy?  
  • Is your SOC/SOAR looking at the right activity?
Productivity
  • Do you have the technology and controls necessary to mitigate and prevent those threats in your core infrastructure?
  • What is your response time?
  • Does your SOC have the access and capabilities necessary to respond to threats as they are occurring?
  • Do you perform proper testing and health monitoring of all of these security controls to ensure everything is operating as expected? 

At Anvilogic, our core mission is helping you improve your SOC’s overall maturity.  Let us know how we can help you.

References:


Sunday, May 17, 2020

From the SOC Frontlines: Post-Breach Detection Content In the SOC




As we work with our enterprise customers in helping them develop new detection content and improve existing content for post-breach detection activity, we are observing a few, common patterns driving development of new detection content in the SOC.  

I have a well-developed security program. Do I need detection content in the SOC?


Most enterprises have an anti-malware detection program spanning email, endpoint, and, in some cases, network. Most attacks targeting endpoints are delivered over email, and therefore, the Secure Email Gateway(SEG) has first cracks at detection.  SEG’s use a mix of static signature based analysis and dynamic analysis using sandboxes. Next up, is the endpoint protection platform (EPP) which can observe the behavior of the payload and do a more detailed analysis, and has multiple cracks at the payload as it moves through its kill chain cycle. Finally, network security has another crack at detecting malicious  traffic including Command and Control.  This set of technologies work really well to block a significant volume of incoming attacks  particularly the known attacks. 

But attacks get through - we all know that. Why? For a number of reasons
  1.  prevention products are very sensitive of false positives and therefore may let a marginally suspicious behavior through; 
  2. there is a lag between when an exploit is delivered and when it is known, a detection developed and rolled out by the security product vendors. 
  3. new generation of malware that use Living off the Land(LotL) techniques tend to appear similar to legitimate software resulting in potentially higher false positives if the product is aggressive or false negatives if it is not.  
  4. Supply chain attacks. When trusted vendor of yours is compromised and the safe-listed executable acts maliciously.

 The SOC As The Last Layer Of Defense

The purpose of the SOC is to catch these attacks that get through these layers of protection and become breaches. How are SOC’s prioritizing their efforts towards detecting breach activity? These are the drivers we have observed amongst our customers for developing detection use cases in the SOC. 

Detection Use Cases Identified by Red Teams 
Mature SOC’s have red teams that are constantly testing their protections and trying to break through them. They are often very specific, and precise sources of identifying which behaviors are getting through the layers of protection.  Often the TTP’s are described in terms of the Mitre ATT&CK framework, along with the specific procedures (the P in TTP) that got through.  The SOC in turn will perform threat hunting tasks to verify if an actual adversary got through using these procedures, and develop detection content based on their log sources collected in their SIEM. Making sure you have the right program in place for collecting logs, parsing and normalizing is critical. See: https://anvilogic.blogspot.com/2020/03/getting-back-to-basics.html). Further, collaboration between the red team/threat item and content team is critical for this purpose as described here: https://anvilogic.blogspot.com/2020/02/patterns-of-collaboration-in-enterprise.html

Detection of Newly Emerging Exploits and Adversaries
Another source of SOC detection use cases, is threat research  that indicates new adversary tactics targeting that industry vertical, geography or the specific company. Often security product vendors have a lag where they identify the exploit, develop a detection, verify for FP’s and FN’s, and roll out the detection in their products.  Mature SOC’s choose to be pro-active and roll out the detection content for these newly emerging exploits in their SOC’s using the log feeds they are collecting in their SIEM. We have helped our customer SOC's rapidly develop detections for targeted attacks involving anti-phishing and business email compromise(BEC) exploits.

Detection of Malicious Usage of Existing System Tools For LotL attacks
A third set of use cases is around technologies and behaviors that are known to be used by adversaries, but also by legitimate software. For example, in recent years we have frequently observed file-less attacks using existing system tools running on endpoints such as WMI, VBScript and PowerShell.  Endpoint protection products struggle to distinguish between legitimate use and malicious exploits that use these technologies. Therefore SOC’s develop and deploy detection content for malicious behaviors that use these Living off the Land techniques.  For example, detection content for suspicious Powershell behaviors are a common category of use cases that are SOC's deploy. These detections also have the problem of being noisy; mature SOC’s are finding ways to generate high fidelity detections by combining an array of these low fidelity detections in specific sequences. 

Are there other drivers in your SOC for creating detection content for post-breach activity? We would like to know!

At Anvilogic, we are helping address SOC’s develop content for all of the above use cases using our SOC Content Platform(https://anvilogic.blogspot.com/2020/04/the-future-state-of-siems-part-1-what.html). Let us know if we can help you. 

Sunday, April 19, 2020

The Future State of SIEMs - Part 1 (The "what")

SIEMs haven't changed much in 10+ years. They primarily remain as good data collection technologies and data repositories, and depending on the vendor, decent alert engines to direct SOC analysts to noteworthy events. However, the most fundamental, and arguably highest value component, is the content - the detection logic that leads to noteworthy, actionable alerts - this continues to be the bane of every SIEM's existence.

No matter which enterprise SOC it is, the most common pain points can be generally categorized into two themes - 1) too much noise from false positives and uninteresting 'incidents', and 2) inability to detect a higher percentage of threats mapping to priorities and exposures.

Good technology is only a part of the solution, the other part is domain expertise - high-efficacy, relevant and precise detections coming from sophisticated logic that leverages all key data sources necessary. SIEMs were built on the first part and continue to invest in that whereas the second, and more important part, comes from experts in the field, mostly those in enterprise SOCs. Its hard for them as they need to understand how the underlying technology works, and work around deficiencies in those technologies as well as the availability of data sources. There are at least two ways of looking at this problem: a top-down approach and a bottom-up approach.

The top-down approach starts with laying out corporate cyber-security priorities, for e.g., vis-a-vis the MITRE ATT&CK framework, and setting up ranked priorities upon which the "SIEM" can operate by producing alerts mapping to those priorities. This, of course, needs the right data sources, and the right detection content to produce the necessary alerts that can be 'actioned' downstream.

The bottom-up approach starts with building detection logic simply leveraging the available, and often most mundane, data sources while not exceeding the license restrictions of the underlying SIEM. This typically starts as a stop-gap approach but too often ends up being the ultimate implementation of security operations for many shops, unfortunately.

The right way to solve this problem is to break down existing legacy SIEM architectures and separate out the content part to make it an independent service that will provide the necessary, ready-to-deploy logic to the underlying run-time engine (which does not have to be a traditional SIEM) and produce few appropriate alerts to the SOC team for further action.

We will be discussing how to go about transitioning to the new and future state of security operations in the coming parts of this blog post. We will discuss how to leverage existing SIEMs but not be confined to only those as data repositories and rather have a more distributed and cloud-based SIEM architecture that leverages an independent content streaming service that feeds the run-time engine to produce only the necessary, and most important/relevant/actionable, alerts to the SOC team for maximum efficacy and efficiency. Stay tuned for more on this subject ...




Friday, April 3, 2020

Content Conundrums for the SOC: Part I

Organizations are constantly in need to keep their threat detection content up to date but with an ever changing threat landscape, organizations struggle to properly develop viable content that is relevant to their security needs leaving unnecessary time spent on irrelevant content, increased remediation times, and large security detection gaps. In order to effectively do this, organizations need to do two things: an introspective look into their current cyber security state, and have a methodology for developing detection content.

Introspection requires an organization to understand the relevant threats and threat groups associated with their industry, understand their current infrastructure, and understand what their attack surface looks like. By taking a deep look, organizations can better identify what kind of emerging and existing threats are applicable to themselves, and pinpoint their efforts to developing detection content dedicated towards those threats. Ideally, the output of this exercise is a full breakdown of everything from security infrastructure design to relevant threat groups with associated MITRE ATT&CK mappings. As you are probably thinking, this introspection is the foundation to start the next step in almost any area of cyber security but we will focus on content development surrounding threat detection.

Now that organizational needs are all mapped out, the process of developing detection content is more targeted since there is no question as to whether a new or emerging threat is relevant. This may seem like a simple task but the reality is that every time a new critical threat emerges, most organizations scramble to determine if and how they are affected. Wouldn’t it be nice to just know whether you need to start developing detection content or not? And if you can immediately determine that you are not affected, wouldn’t it be great to not waste resources on the irrelevant and continue to focus on that backlog of the relevant? With that being said, how should an organization develop detection content for the threats that are relevant?

In order to do this, organizations are going to need some organizational unit to perform functions similar to the B.A.D. (Build, Attack, Defend) pyramid. For those unfamiliar with the concept, the B.A.D. pyramid essentially covers the critical components needed to properly defend an organization and, in order, they can create an iterative process for developing detection content. To be clear, these do not need to actually be different teams but are personas in the detection content development process. To give an idea of how this process would flow, after an organization identifies a new threat, they would employ their Attack component, or Red Team, to simulate the threat within an environment. From here the Defend component, or Blue Team, would either fully, partially, or not detect the threat. This information gets passed onto the Build component, or Yellow Team, to create or modify the necessary detection content for this particular threat who will then kick off the whole process once again for validation. It is an iterative loop until the detection content is ready to be published which requires full transparency so that no detection logic associated with the threat is overlooked. This is required even if a detection is already made, there may be opportunity to improve detection logic by either including other threat indicators or even just tightening detection logic to improve processing and filtering out false positives.

With this information an organization can begin to take the first steps towards effectively creating net new threat detection content, but there are still ways to improve this process in order to make it more repeatable and streamlined. Stay tuned for Content Conundrums for the SOC: Part II. Let us know how we can help you or visit us at www.anvilogic.com.